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Abstract
We examine the effect on the incidence of casualties and crashes of a city-wide vehi-
cle speed limit reduction in New York City (NYC) streets. The law change, part of 
Mayor Bill de Blasio’s Vision Zero Action Plan to improve traffic safety, cuts the 
default speed limit for streets with no speed limit signs from 30 to 25 mph begin-
ning November 7, 2014. We use a monthly panel dataset with crash statistics for 
the entire population of NYC streets, from July 2012 through March 2019. Several 
difference-in-differences regressions show a statistically significant and meaningful 
decline in injuries and crashes.
Keywords Traffic · Safety · Traffic laws
JEL Classification R410 · R480
Introduction
The traffic safety concept known as Vision Zero originated in Sweden in 1996 and 
became law there in October 1997 (Larsson et al. 2010). The Vision Zero approach 
seeks to create a road transport system in which crashes never result in fatalities 
or serious injuries; while crashes resulting from human error cannot be eliminated, 
the traffic environment must be designed so that the mechanical force of any crash 
does not exceed the tolerance of the human body (Tingvall and Haworth 1999).1 
 * Kristin Mammen 
 kristin.mammen@csi.cuny.edu
1 Department of Economics, Lucille and Jay Chazanoff School of Business, College of Staten 
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1 Tingvall and Haworth articulate that crashes with lesser (not long-term disabling) injuries or no inju-
ries are beyond the scope of Vision Zero—reducing those types of crashes is not a goal of the approach. 
However, in practice, it is plausible that changes in speed made to reduce the severity of injuries from 
crashes may also reduce the total number of crashes and the number of lesser- or no-injury crashes.
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Vision Zero therefore rejects the traditional approach which placed responsibility 
for crashes almost entirely on road users, and reallocates it largely to traffic sys-
tem designers (Tingvall and Haworth 1999), a term which refers broadly to all pub-
lic and private entities which shape the traffic environment.2 Sweden now has the 
world’s safest roads, with a road fatality rate of 2.8 per 100,000 persons compared to 
12.4 in the US (WHO 2018), and programs similar to Vision Zero, sometimes called 
Safe Systems approaches, have been implemented in a number of countries, states, 
and cities around the world (NTSB 2017).
New York City (NYC) has the oldest and most established Vision Zero program 
among the US cities (Vision Zero Network 2017), spearheaded by Mayor Bill de 
Blasio since 2014 (McGeehan 2014).3 The city program naturally differs from the 
national-level Swedish program due to differences in culture and administrative 
powers (Flegenheimer 2014), but Vision Zero NYC has reduced annual traffic fatali-
ties from the 2010–2013 average of 321 to 214 in 2017, the lowest number since 
1910 when record-keeping began (NYC-MOO 2018, p. 13).
The current investigation evaluates the impact of one of the most sweep-
ing policy changes of Vision Zero NYC, the reduction in the speed limit on 
unsigned streets from 30 miles per hour to 25 miles per hour (mph) on Novem-
ber 7, 2014 (NYC-MOO 2015, p. 30). Although more than 30 US cities are 
considered Vision Zero Cities (Vision Zero Network 2019),4 there has been lit-
tle study of the effects of the speed limit reduction component of the Vision 
Zero program in the USA. Our results suggest that the policy has been broadly 
effective in increasing road safety. We find a 38.7% decline in casualties and a 
35.8% reduction in crashes on treated streets relative to the remaining popula-
tion of streets in New York City. The decline in crashes occurred in the 2 years 
after the law change, and there were no further effects subsequently. Although 
we cannot measure traffic speed directly, the results are consistent with drivers 
reducing their speeds on treated streets throughout the five boroughs of NYC as 
a result of the speed limit reduction. The decline in casualties was the greatest 
in the Bronx and Queens, the two most densely populated boroughs after Man-
hattan, and statistically insignificant in the other three boroughs. In Manhattan, 
the already low travel speeds due to traffic congestion likely muted the effects 
2 As described in Belin (2016), “‘System designer’ is a diffuse concept but it refers to any of the public 
and private agencies responsible for the design and operation of various parts of a transportation system, 
including roads, vehicles, and public transit services, and those responsible for any support systems, such 
as laws and regulations, education and public awareness, surveillance, rescue, and care and rehabilitation. 
State and municipal road-maintenance authorities, vehicle manufacturers, driver education programs and 
schools, private transportation companies, and healthcare providers are among the other stakeholders 
included in the definition of system designer.”
3 The previous NYC mayor, Michael Bloomberg had implemented programs and street design changes 
to increase safety and improve conditions for pedestrians and bicyclists (NYC-DOT 2013).
4 The Vision Zero Network is a national nonprofit advocating for Vision Zero programs. Its criteria for 
designating cities as Vision Zero are: “(1) sets clear goal of eliminating traffic fatalities and severe inju-
ries, (2) Mayor has publicly, officially committed to Vision Zero, (3) Vision Zero plan or strategy is in 
place, or Mayor has committed to doing so in clear time frame, and (4) key city departments (including 
Police, Transportation, and Public Health) are engaged.” (Vision Zero Network 2019).
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of the policy, while in the lower density boroughs, Brooklyn and Staten Island, 
there may have been less scope for reduced speeds to improve traffic safety. 
The finding of increased traffic safety is especially important given that reduc-
ing speed limits is one of the lower-cost policy options available.
Literature Review
The success of Vision Zero Sweden and a general reassessment of road safety 
management by policymakers and road safety management professionals in 
the past 30 years have led to the implementation of safe systems approaches in 
countries, states, and cities across the world (e.g., NTSB 2017, p. 29).5 For the 
most part, crash fatalities have been reduced in these jurisdictions, and Vision 
Zero is widely considered to be the cutting edge in increasing road safety 
(e.g., Hauer 2010; OECD 2008). For entities continuing with the traditional 
cost–benefit analysis approach, the choice appears to be a function of political 
will and the lingering professional practice of weighting mobility more highly 
than safety (Hauer 2010; Noland 2013; OECD 2008), rather than an argument 
that Vision Zero is ineffective.6
The study of the effectiveness of specific Vision Zero elements has not been sys-
tematic (cf. Wegman et al. 2015); but it is important to understand which policies 
are most effective in order to allocate resources efficiently (Montag 2014, p. 539). 
Therefore, the current investigation considers the effect of Vision Zero NYC’s speed 
limit reduction. This inquiry is important because vehicle speeds are widely recog-
nized as a crucial factor in traffic safety, and because changing speed limits is one of 
the lower-cost policy options available (Archer et al. 2008, p. 11). The existing liter-
ature has shown that reducing speed limits decreases average operating speeds (e.g., 
NTSB 2017, p. 27), although the reduction in speed is typically smaller than the 
reduction in the speed limit (e.g., OECD 2006, p. 100), especially if no other speed 
counter measures are taken (Finch et al. 1994). Broadly, this implies at least some 
portions of drivers are influenced by the statutory speed limit. In turn, reduced vehi-
cle speeds decrease the incidence and severity of crashes (e.g., Elvik 2005; NTSB 
2017, p. 4).
5 The program broadly referred to as Toward Zero Deaths (TZD) has been promulgated by 30 US states 
since 2001. Munnich et  al. (2012) find that the four longest-standing programs, in Idaho, Minnesota, 
Utah and Washington, have been effective in reducing traffic fatalities. They note, “Successful TZD pro-
grams have five characteristics: (1) an ambitious goal of eliminating traffic fatalities and serious injuries; 
(2) high levels of inter-agency cooperation in pursuit of the TZD goal among state departments of trans-
portation, public safety, health, and other relevant agencies; (3) a comprehensive strategy addressing all 
4 E’s—engineering, enforcement, education, and EMS (emergency medical services) elements of traffic 
safety; (4) a performance-based, data-driven system of targeting resources and strategies where they will 
have the greatest impact in reducing traffic fatalities; and (5) policy leadership from relevant entities, 
including the Governor, the state legislature, and the heads of state agencies.”
6 As one would expect, in low- and middle-income countries, weak legislation and enforcement, and 
lack of resources are often major impediments to improvements in traffic safety (Peden et al. 2004).
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Most studies of speed limit changes in the USA focus on the decrease and 
increase in maximum highway speed limits of the 1970s and 1990s (e.g., 
Fowles and Loeb 1989). Relatively few academic studies have examined the 
effects of speed limit reduction in lower-speed roads (Goodwin et  al. 2015, 
p. 3–14), and these are primarily outside of the US. The studies most simi-
lar to the current investigation evaluated default speed limit reductions from 
37 to 31  mph in built-up (urban) areas of four Australian states implemented 
from 1999 to 2003.7 “Default speed limit” denotes the statutory or legislated 
speed limit on roads with no posted speed limits (Donnell et  al. 2009, p. 4), 
or in other words, it is the speed limit on unsigned roads, so few or no signage 
changes are necessary. Using various methodologies, casualty crash measures, 
and where available, vehicle speed measures, the results show broadly that cas-
ualty crashes and speeds declined with the treatment.8 Three further pertinent 
studies examined speed limit reductions implemented (in contrast to New York 
City’s) by changing the speed limit signs on sections of roadways at a small 
number of selected sites in the localities: Bristol, England (Bornioli et al. 2018; 
30–20 mph), Edmonton, Canada (Islam et al. 2014; 30–25 mph), and Columbia 
and Springfield, Missouri (Rossy et  al. 2012; 30–25 mph). These studies did 
not have casualty crash data, but found that average vehicle speeds declined 
significantly.9
The current study contributes to the literature by investigating the first 
US city-wide reduction in the speed limit of an entire class of roadways (the 
streets with no posted speed limits). Our dataset comprises the entire popu-
lation of NYC streets within a long interval before and after the speed limit 
reduction. We are able to examine many measures of traffic safety including 
injuries, fatalities, number of crashes, and number of vehicles in crashes that 
were speeding; and we can disaggregate casualties for motorists, pedestrians, 
and bicyclists.
7 The studies are: Hoareau and Newstead (2004) (Western Australia—state-wide—December 2001); 
Hoareau et al. (2006) (Victoria—state-wide—January 2001); Hoareau et al. (2002) (South East Queens-
land—March 1999); Kloeden et al. (2006) (Southwestern Australia—March 2003).
8 A speed limit reduction from 37 to 31 mph in urban areas of New South Wales differed from this 
study, and the other Australian studies in that participation by local governments was voluntary and 
reduced speed limits were denoted with extensive signage; crashes and speeds were reduced (New South 
Wales Road Traffic Authority (NSW RTA) 2000, as cited in Hoareau et al. 2006).
9 Three additional academic studies are similar to the current investigation in examining the effect on 
casualty crashes of speed limit changes in urban areas. In Oslo, Norway, Elvik (2013) found a temporary 
reduction from 50 to 37.5 mph on arterial roads reduced casualty crashes by 25–35%. In Hong Kong, 
Wong et al. (2005) found speed limit increases of 31–43 mph and 44–50 mph increased casualty crashes 
by 1–36%. In London, England, Grundy et al. (2009) found a 42% reduction in casualty crashes where 20 
mph zones were implemented. These studies differ from ours in being implemented at selected sites with 
signage changes. In addition, the first two studies considered urban highways (NYC’s highways were not 
affected by the NYC speed limit reduction), and the London study considered “zones” where speed limit 
reduction is accompanied by substantial traffic-calming engineering interventions.
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Data and Methodology
Table 1 gives variable definitions for our data. The NYC Police Department (NYPD) 
provides monthly traffic crash statistics, including injuries, fatalities, casualties 
(injuries plus fatalities), number of crashes, and casualties disaggregated by victim 
type—motorists, pedestrians, and bicyclists.10
The treatment we investigate is the reduction in New York City’s default speed 
limit from 30 to 25 mph on November 7, 2014 as part of the Vision Zero Action 
Plan (NYC 2014).11 All streets in New York City are now governed by this 25 mph 
speed limit unless otherwise signed. Our main independent variable of interest is the 
difference-in-differences coefficient on the interaction term of an indicator for obser-
vations dated later than November 7, 2014 (the treatment period) and an indicator 
for unsigned streets (the treatment group). The Vision Zero NYC speed limit reduc-
tion was accompanied by publicity to inform drivers of the law change, which seems 
a necessity to change driver behavior, since there were no speed limit signs on the 
Table 1  Variable definitions. Source: Motor Vehicles Collision Data, NYPD
Data Page: https ://data.cityo fnewy ork.us/Publi c-Safet y/NYPD-Motor -Vehic le-Colli sions /h9gi-nx95
Data dictionary: https ://data.cityo fnewy ork.us/api/views /h9gi-nx95/files /b5fd8 e71-ca48-4e96-bf63-1b8a7 
c4cc4 7b?downl oad=true&filen ame=Colli sion_DataD ictio nary.xlsx
Variable Definition
Injuries Sum for a given street–month–year of injuries from traffic crashes subdivided into 
motorists (drivers or passengers in cars or motorcycles), pedestrians, and bicyclists
Fatalities Sum for a given street–month–year of fatalities from traffic crashes to motorists, 
pedestrians, and bicyclists
Crashes Sum for a given street–month–year of traffic crashes, with or without resulting 
casualties
Speed attributions Sum for a given street–month–year of vehicles for which police officers on the scene 
declared that “speed” was the cause of the vehicle’s involvement in a crash
Treatment group = 1 if street is unsigned
Treatment period = 1 for dates after November 7, 2014
10 The NYPD Motor Vehicles Collision Data compiles information from Police Accident Reports (form 
MV104-AN) filled out by an officer at the crash scene. Officers are required to report on all crashes 
where fatalities or injuries of any level of severity occur. If a crash victim has suffered multiple injuries, 
only the most severe injury is listed in the report. Officers assess injuries either by observation (for exam-
ple, if the victim is unconscious) or from information reported by the crash victim (for example, if there 
is no visible injury but the victim reports pain or nausea). (NYS-DMV no date, pages 1 and 26). There-
fore, in this paper “casualty” refers to a fatality or any injury observed by, or reported by the victim to, 
the officer at the crash scene.
11 Speed limits remained constant throughout the study period on the control streets. The control streets 
include larger streets, such as limited access highways or major arterial streets, with posted speed limits 
of 30 mph and above; and some smaller streets, such as those near schools, which are signed for speeds 
less than 25 mph. (NYC Vision Zero 25-MPH-faq 2014). The majority of NYC streets are unsigned 
(see Table 2); this is the treatment group. The statutory speed limit on these streets was 30 mph prior to 
November 7, 2014, and 25 mph thereafter.
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affected streets to convey the changed speed limit.12 However, it appears that the 
other education, enforcement, and engineering elements of the Vision Zero Action 
Plan (NYC 2014) were applied to both treated and control streets; for example, these 
interventions were largely targeted at historically high-crash locations designated 
Priority Corridors, Intersections, and Areas (NYC–MOO 2019, p. 23), not toward 
the streets with reduced speed limits. We argue therefore that the difference-in-dif-
ferences coefficient captures the effect of the speed limit reduction.
Note that the crash data are recorded by location, while the speed limit data are 
recorded by street. We therefore allocate all crashes to the street within 150 feet of 
them. For crashes close to two or more streets, we allocate the crash at random to one 
of the streets within 150 feet. Figure 1 illustrates a hypothetical fatality crash at the 
circled intersection, for which the fatality would be attributed at random to one of the 
(bolded) adjacent streets.
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the treatment streets (no posted speed limit) 
and all remaining streets (speed limit posted) before and after the law change. The 
combined total of signed and unsigned streets represents the total population of NYC 
streets. These summary statistics show broadly that streets without signs appear safer 
by many measures. A priori, we attribute the lower level of collisions to both the lower 
speeds and other fixed features of the road (smaller sizes, less crowded neighborhoods). 
Later, we will control for fixed effects with the appropriate standard methodology. 
Despite having fewer crashes per street, these unsigned roads occupy the vast majority 
of the city and therefore the majority of collisions occur on them.
In addition to measures of traffic safety (casualties, injured, fatalities, count of 
unique crashes), Table 2 disaggregates the data by type of victim. Motorists are the 
most frequent casualties of a crash, then pedestrians and lastly cyclists, which seems to 
match the time and number of each of these groups’ time on the road. The last variable, 
speed attributions, is not a crash of any type, but rather the count of times officers on 
the scene declared that “speed” was the cause of a vehicle’s involvement in a crash. So, 
for example, in a three-car crash, two could have “speed” attributed as the contributing 
factor and the third could be “brake failure.”
Figure 2a illustrates that most NYC streets are unsigned. The blocks of black-lined 
signed streets represent densely settled neighborhoods with relatively many signed 
streets. Figure 2b shows the (red/yellow) concentration of crashes in central Manhat-
tan, though there are a few scattered hotspots of accidents in Brooklyn, the Bronx, and 
Queens. The accidents generally follow major roadways and seem to match typical traf-
fic patterns.
Figure  3 shows the counts over time of casualties for the treated and untreated 
groups before and after the speed limit was reduced on treated streets. The treated 
and untreated streets, when fit with splines before and after the law change, exhibit 
12 Polling results in the 1-year report indicate that in October 2014 prior to the law change, 30% of New 
York drivers accurately identified the default 30 mph speed limit. The city conducted “25 MPH Out-
reach” in the fall of 2014, with street-team in-person distribution and mailings of publicity materials, 
social media postings and radio ads. In December 2014, 62% of New York drivers correctly identified the 
new 25 mph speed limit (NYC-MOO 2015, p. 46). Campaigns are ongoing regarding the 25 mph speed 
limit and its safety benefits (NYC-MOO 2019, p. 18, 68).
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Fig. 1  Attributing casualties to street segments
Table 2  Summary statistics: means by street–month–year
(1) (2) (3)





n = 7120 n = 1080 n = 8200
Casualties 0.45 1.70 0.65
Injuries 0.45 1.70 0.64
Fatalities 0.00 0.01 0.00
Crashes 1.81 6.13 2.48
Motorist casualties 0.31 1.30 0.46
Pedestrian casualties 0.10 0.29 0.13
Cyclist casualties 0.04 0.11 0.05




parallel casualty trends in both the pre-treatment and post-treatment periods. The 
treated streets show a modest relative decline in casualties at the treatment date, though 
this is not a clear-cut change. This illustrates the need for investigation into the pol-
icy to see if it is actually associated with overall increased street safety. We next use a 
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difference-in-differences methodology to illustrate this point and show that the decline 
is statistically significant after fixed effects are included. The specification is:
Here, 
i
 represents a fixed effect for each street (which includes if the street 
is eventually treated or not) and 
t
 , a monthly fixed effect for every month–year 
of the observation window. The indicator variable TreatmentPd
t
 takes the value 
zero before November 2014 and the value one afterward, representing any change 
that may have happened to streets city-wide once the treatment period began in 
November of 2014. The coefficient 
2
 is the difference-in-differences coefficient 
representing the change in the treated streets during the treatment period relative 
to the change in the untreated streets.
Results
Overall, we find the speed limit reduction is associated with improved safety on the 
treated streets relative to the untreated streets. Table 3 reports the results of several 
linear difference-in-differences estimations, for casualties (injuries plus fatalities), 
injuries, and fatalities, respectively, and the count of unique crashes.13 We use street-
level and month–year fixed effects for all estimates.
Column 1 supports the result in Fig. 2. Lower-speed limits are associated with 
approximately 0.17 fewer casualties per month per treated street relative to the con-
trols, a reduction of 38.7%.14 Column 2 shows the reduction in casualties is almost 
entirely composed of a decline in injuries, while Column 3 shows there is no meas-
urable change in fatalities along the treated streets. Column 4 shows the relative 
count of crashes has declined by about 0.65 crashes per treated street per month, 
a reduction of 35.8%,15 suggesting about 27% of these reduced crashes would have 
had associated injuries, though it is likely many non-injurious crashes go unre-
ported.16 In Table  4, we decompose crashes by type of victim and the attributed 
cause of the crash.
Column 1 shows a large and significant decline in injuries and fatalities for 
motorists, suggesting that the decline in speed limit was associated with a decline of 
nearly 0.19 motorist casualties per month per treated street. This decline is negated 
somewhat by the measured, but very small, increase in pedestrian casualties shown 
in Column 2 of roughly two casualties per every hundred streets. Column 3 con-

















13 We perform the same exercises for Fixed-Effect Negative Binomial estimation, and a pooled Zero-
Inflated Poisson estimation (since one cannot use fixed effects in ZIP without manually enforcing them), 
see Weber (2014) for more details. The results remain similar in significance and direction.
14 This 38.7% is calculated by: (− 0.174/0.45)*100, where 0.45 is the average number of casualties on 
treated streets (Table 2, row 1, column 1).
15 This 35.8% is calculated by: (− 0.648/1.81)*100, where 1.8 is the average number of crashes (Table 2, 
row 4. column 1).
16 This 27% is calculated by: (− 0.174/− 0.648)*100.
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zero. When summed these three columns encompass all possible injuries to return 
to the original estimate in Table 3, Column 1. The dependent variable in Column 
4 is speed attributions. Note that around the time of the policy change, there is a 
large increase in speed attributions, suggesting that officers became more aware of 
Table 3  Road safety outcomes: difference in differences results
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Casualties Injuries Fatalities Crashes
After November 2014 0.105 0.108* − 0.002 0.538***
(0.065) (0.065) (0.003) (0.162)
D-I-D − 0.174*** − 0.174*** 0.000 − 0.648***
(0.045) (0.045) (0.001) (0.132)
Constant 0.785*** 0.780*** 0.005** 2.543***
(0.028) (0.028) (0.002) (0.045)
Street FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Monthly FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 520,615 520,615 520,615 520,615
R-squared 0.008 0.008 0.000 0.023
F test 12.60 12.54 1.335 23.40
Prob > F 0 0 0.0243 0
Number of streets 8200 8200 8200 8200
Table 4  Heterogeneity in difference-in-differences results
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Motorist casualties Pedestrian casualties Cyclist casualties Speed attributions
After November 2014 0.187*** − 0.058*** − 0.023** 0.104***
(0.062) (0.015) (0.010) (0.011)
D-I-D − 0.191*** 0.023*** − 0.007* − 0.054***
(0.044) (0.007) (0.003) (0.008)
Constant 0.566*** 0.131*** 0.088*** − 0.010***
(0.025) (0.010) (0.007) (0.002)
Street FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Monthly FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 520,615 520,615 520,615 520,615
R-squared 0.007 0.004 0.008 0.018
F test 11.01 9.623 11.04 18.29
Prob > F 0 0 0 0
Number of streets 8200 8200 8200 8200
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speed as a contributing factor; this is likely a result of Vision Zero’s refocusing of 
police initiatives (NYC-MOO 2018, p. 34). In spite of the increase in the count of 
speed attributions, we observe a significant relative reduction of about 0.05 of these 
attributions per treated street per month, suggesting that speed is less likely to be a 
contributing factor for crashes on treated streets. Such a decline would be exactly 
what one would expect to see if traffic on treated streets were indeed slower after the 
speed limit change.
In Table  5, we consider several timing effects (leads) as robustness checks. In 
each estimation, we include 6 months of leads prior to the actual speed limit change 
in 2014.17 These leads are intended to capture any irregularities prior to the intro-
duction of the treatment. We also implicitly capture any potential announcement 
effects from the passing of the Vision Zero speed limit change law, which happened 
the month prior. Reassuringly, the estimated coefficient on our D-I-D is essentially 
unchanged.18
In Column 1, the use of 6 monthly leads leaves the estimated D-I-D coefficient 
largely unchanged, increasing the measured association between the speed limit 
change and overall casualties slightly to a significant − 0.175 casualties per street. 
In Column 2, injuries remain the overwhelming contributors of casualties; there are 
roughly − 0.172 fewer injuries in treated streets per month. In Column 3, although 
the measured association between fatalities and the speed limit change reverses sign 
to show a decrease after the speed limit change, the association remains broadly 
insignificant and essentially zero. Column 4 shows the change in overall crash 
counts; it remains negative, large, and significant at − 0.365, or about 1/3 fewer 
crashes in the treated streets per month after the treatment. Column 5 shows that 
the reduction in speed attributions on treated streets remains roughly constant and 
significant at − 0.05. Overall, the leads were broadly insignificant, with only two of 
the individual D-I-D leads obtaining any level of significance (in column 4); and no 
particular pattern is visible (for example, the significant coefficients are of opposite 
sign). Jointly, the leads of the D-I-D for change in count of crashes (column 4) were 
significant at a 1% level, and the leads for change in speed attributions (column 5) 
were significant at a 10% level, suggesting that there may have been some changes 
in reporting crashes or changes in how crashes may be attributed to speed.
We also examine potential delayed effects of the treatment, e.g., if it takes time 
for individuals to adjust to the policy. In Table 6, we use three one-year lags of the 
D-I-D and treatment period [excluding the first year of treatment (Islam et al. 2004)], 
in order to check if the impact of the policy was spread over several time periods. 
We find that the decline in crashes seems to be fully complete by about 2 years after 
17 We omit the decomposition into different types of victims here for brevity, since we show the aggre-
gated totals, but these estimates with leads are available upon request.
18 In addition to implicitly capturing the announcement effect in the leads, we tried to isolate it exclu-
sively. Creating a separate difference-in-differences for the announcement on October 2014 in the eight 
estimations from Tables 3 and 4 does not meaningfully change the coefficients on our primary D-I-D, the 
speed limit change. Furthermore, in the eight specifications tested, the D-I-D for the announcement effect 
was insignificant in all specifications except for the count of crashes, where it was significantly negative. 
These results are available upon request.
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the treatment, and by the third year most of the coefficients have settled to zero. 
There may be a small but significant increase in the count of fatalities or crashes on 
these unsigned streets roughly 3 years after implementation, but these coefficients 
are at least canceled out by the significant reductions observed in the prior year.
We next decompose our primary results by borough, dividing the streets among 
the districts where necessary. Some collisions were not contained within a borough’s 
land boundaries, instead they were on bridges, for example, and these observations 
were discarded. In Table 7, we see that the reduction in speed attributions is rela-
tively uniform across all the boroughs regardless of density, and strongly significant. 
Officers appear to be less likely to claim speed was a factor in collisions on treated 
streets across all boroughs after the law was changed.
Table 5  Robustness checks for pre-treatment effects
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Casualties Injuries Fatalities Crashes Speed attributions
After November 2014 − 0.038 − 0.042 0.004 − 0.479*** 0.110***
(0.104) (0.103) (0.005) (0.178) (0.011)
D-I-D − 0.175*** − 0.172*** − 0.002 − 0.365** − 0.049***
− 0.038 − 0.042 0.004 (0.142) (0.008)
D-I-D 1-month lead − 0.031 − 0.036 0.005 − 0.167 − 0.001
(0.078) (0.078) (0.004) (0.105) (0.004)
D-I-D 2-month lead − 0.015 − 0.013 − 0.002 − 0.092 0.002
(0.084) (0.083) (0.005) (0.111) (0.004)
D-I-D 3-month lead 0.145 0.144 0.001 0.003 − 0.001
(0.090) (0.090) (0.004) (0.101) (0.004)
D-I-D 4-month lead 0.015 0.016 − 0.001 0.261** 0.003
(0.094) (0.093) (0.004) (0.110) (0.005)
D-I-D 5-month lead − 0.093 − 0.096 0.003 − 0.051 − 0.007
(0.099) (0.098) (0.005) (0.104) (0.005)
D-I-D 6-month lead − 0.026 − 0.023 − 0.003 − 0.274** − 0.002
(0.075) (0.076) (0.0036) (0.108) (0.003)
Constant 0.788*** 0.784*** 0.004** 2.553*** − 0.008***
(0.029) (0.029) (0.002) (0.044) (0.002)
Street FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Monthly FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 520,445 520,445 520,445 520,445 520,445
R-squared 0.008 0.008 0.000 0.023 0.017
F test 11.36 11.29 1.195 11.36 16.12
Prob > F 0 0 0.098 0 0
Number of streets 8189 8189 8189 8189 8189
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Given this relatively uniform change in speed attributions by officers, one might 
anticipate a similarly uniform reduction in casualties, which we decompose by bor-
ough in Table  8. We find the reduction in casualties is not present in Manhattan, 
but takes effect almost entirely in the other two most densely populated boroughs. 
Possibly, the policy change has limited scope for effect in Manhattan because con-
gestion often keeps travel speeds lower than the speed limit.19 The reductions in the 
other two densest districts, the Bronx and Queens, are strongly significant. This is in 
contrast to the uniform reduction in speed attributions across the boroughs delivered 
by police officers.
Discussion
The main results in Table 3 are consistent with a decline in casualties and crashes 
caused by the speed limit reduction. Here, we briefly discuss possible mechanisms 
behind this outcome. The decline, on treated streets, of crashes caused by speed-
ing (Table 4 column 4), suggests that average operating speeds decreased on treated 
streets. Although our study cannot measure vehicle speeds directly, our results con-
cur with the widely found evidence in the literature that a reduction in the speed 
limit reduces average traffic speed (e.g., Elvik et al. 2004, p. 93).20 In particular, of 
Table 6  Robustness checks for delayed effect of treatment
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Casualties Injuries Fatalities Crashes Speed attributions
D-I-D (1-year lag) − 0.085** − 0.085** 0.000 − 0.218** − 0.045***
(0.034) (0.034) (0.001) (0.095) (0.007)
D-I-D (2-year lag) − 0.284*** − 0.281*** − 0.003** − 0.868*** − 0.033***
(0.048) (0.047) (0.001) (0.130) (0.007)
D-I-D (3-year lag) 0.020 0.016 0.004** 0.179*** 0.005
(0.030) (0.030) (0.001) (0.055) (0.005)
Constant 0.788*** 0.784*** 0.004** 2.553*** − 0.008***
(0.029) (0.029) (0.002) (0.044) (0.002)
Street FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Monthly FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 520,445 520,445 520,445 520,445 520,445
R-squared 0.010 0.010 0.000 0.026 0.020
F test 13.47 13.40 1.316 23.82 17.50
Prob > F 0 0 0.0271 0 0
Number of streets 8189 8189 8189 8189 8189
19 NYC-DOT (2019) discusses city-wide congestion and low travel speeds, particularly in Manhattan.
20 Earlier studies of highway traffic sometimes found little effect of speed limit reductions on mean travel 
speeds (e.g., Parker 1997).
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the studies cited earlier of similar speed reductions on urban streets, those which had 
measured speed available as an outcome all found operating speed reductions. So we 
believe it is reasonable to infer that vehicle speed declined after the treatment.
Table 7  Crash-causing speed attributions by borough
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Brooklyn Bronx Manhattan Queens Staten Island
After November 2014 0.100*** 0.108*** 0.073*** 0.113*** 0.074***
(0.018) (0.026) (0.017) (0.020) (0.019)
D-I-D − 0.052*** − 0.069*** − 0.046*** − 0.058*** − 0.028***
(0.014) (0.019) (0.016) (0.017) (0.006)
Constant − 0.007** − 0.010** 0.001 − 0.010*** − 0.003
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Street FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Monthly FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 126,385 97,942 69,341 163,609 129,793
R-squared 0.022 0.022 0.015 0.018 0.009
F test 7.162 5.262 3.994 7.920 3.859
Prob > F 0 0 0 0 0
Number of streets 1791 1416 910 2438 2744
Table 8  Casualties by borough
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Bronx Brooklyn Manhattan Queens Staten Island
After November 2014 0.424** − 0.059 − 0.337*** 0.259*** 0.150
(0.213) (0.123) (0.117) (0.076) (0.093)
D-I-D − 0.442*** − 0.032 0.117 − 0.241*** − 0.029
(0.169) (0.068) (0.076) (0.069) (0.024)
Constant 0.618*** 1.064*** 0.986*** 0.674*** 0.299***
(0.065) (0.057) (0.059) (0.050) (0.044)
Street FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Monthly FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 97,942 126,385 69,341 163,609 129,793
R-squared 0.013 0.011 0.009 0.010 0.006
F test 4.133 5.483 3.218 5.390 4.875
Prob > F 0 0 0 0 0
Number of streets 1416 1791 910 2438 2744
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What caused the slowdown? The question of whether and under what cir-
cumstances drivers comply with limits looms large in the literature from both 
academics and practitioners (e.g., Elvik 2016; NTSB 2017, p. 17). Although 
drivers weigh a number of factors when choosing operating speeds (e.g., Foster 
2010; Nagler 2013; Warner and Åberg 2008), it is widely argued that speed 
limits do cause at least some portion of drivers to reduce speeds (e.g., Archer 
et  al. 2008, p. 2), along with awareness campaigns, enforcement, and traffic-
calming design measures (TRB 1998, Ch. 4 and 5). The latter three interven-
tions (or combinations thereof) are considered important mediators on the 
effect of speed limits on operating speed, but measuring and quantifying their 
effects remains a topic of debate (e.g., Elvik et al. 2004, p. 76; Luca 2015, TRB 
1998, p. 133). These types of interventions were part of the package of Vision 
Zero NYC safety initiatives, but they were not limited to the treated streets. We 
argue therefore that the difference-in-differences coefficient captures the effect 
of the speed limit reduction in the treated streets relative to untreated streets.
Conclusion
We evaluate one of the primary components of the Vision Zero NYC action plan, 
a speed limit reduction from 30 to 25 mph applied to the 86% of the population of 
NYC streets which had no posted speed limit. We examine many measures of traf-
fic safety including injuries, fatalities, number of crashes, and number of crashes 
blamed on speeding; and we can disaggregate casualties for motorists, pedestrians, 
and bicyclists. The difference-in-differences results suggest that the speed limit 
reduction increased traffic safety in New York City. In particular, we find a 38.7% 
decline in casualties and a 35.8% reduction in crashes on treated streets relative to 
the remaining population of streets. The implication that speed limit reduction is an 
effective policy lever in the Vision Zero toolkit is important given that this is one of 
the lower-cost options available.
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